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ATRACT
TheU.S. economy's nonfinancial debt ratio has risen since 1980 to a
level that is extraordinary in comparison with prior historical experience.
Approximately one—half of this rise has consisted of increased indebtedness
(relative to income) of borrowers in the economy's private sector, including
both individuals and businesses, and it therefore at least potentially
represents an increase in the economy—wide exposure to debt default. The U.S.
household sector as a whole has increased its holdings of liquid and other
readily marketable assets, so that in the aggregate its balance sheet is no
less sound than before, but available data make it doubtful that the
distribution of the additional assets matches the distribution of' the
additional debt closely enough to avoid debt service problems in the event of a
general economic contraction. By contrast, in the case of businesses,
including especially the corporate sector, there are no additional assets to
match the additional liabilities, so that balance sheets as well as incomes
have become more leveraged.
The chief implication of this increased exposure to the threat of financial
instability is not only that the U.S. economy is likely to be more prone to
financial instability in the event of' a major business contraction, but also ——
andperhaps more importantly —-that,as a result, U.S. economic policymakers
are likely to be more reluctant either to seek or to tolerate a business
recession in the first place. Experience suggests that it will be difficult to
balance the desire to avoid economic downturns with the ability to avoid
occasional periods of aggregate excess demand, so that this increased
reluctance to tolerate recessions probably implies a more expansionary monetary
policy on average than would otherwise be the case. Experience also suggests
that a plausible result of such a no—recession monetary policy, sustained over
time, is price inflation. This process is self—limiting, however, in that over
time inflation reduces the real value of the private sector's outstanding
nominal indebtedness, hence reducing the risk of financial instability, and
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The American economy during the 1980's has relied on debt financing to a
degree that is unprecedented within the nation's prior experience ——certainly
within this century, and apparently earlier on as well. The combined
indebtedness of both government and private—sector borrowers, which earlier had
shown considerable stability in relation to the economy's overall growth, and
especially so since World WarII,has since 1980 jumped far out of proportion
with nonfinancial economic activity. Moreover, almost all major sectors of the
U.S. economy have participated in this pattern of accelerating borrowing,
including individuals, businesses, and government at all levels.
This sharp break with prior U.S. economic behavior raises several
important issues. For example, at the most fundamental level it casts in a new
light the underlying puzzle of why the relationship between outstanding debt
and economic activity was so stable for so long in the first place. Major
changes in such key factors as interest rate levels, inflation rates, tax rates
and bankruptcy rules could plausibly have changed the U.S. economy's proclivity
toward indebtedness at many points during the course of the twentieth century,
but in fact ——atleast until the 1980's ——theydid not do so. Now carefulanalysis of the most recent experience may resolve such as yet unanswered
questions as whether the prior stability chiefly reflected the behavior of
borrowers or lenders.
Theobjectof this paper is to consider two issues of a more prospective
nature raised by the rise in the U.S. debt totals since 1980. First, has this
increase eroded the ability of the United States to withstand economic shocks?
More specifically, has it raised the threat of financial instability in the
sense of disruptions in the orderly functioning of payment flows that would, in
turn, either magnify a disturbance to the economy originating from some
nonfinancial source or impose on the nonfinancial economy contractionary
effects initially due to some purely financial cause? Second, if the increase
in indebtedness has eroded U.S. financial stability, will the awareness of this
deterioration constrain the future conduct of U.S. monetary policy? In
particular, will fear of the consequences of financial instability render
Federal Reserve System policymakers reluctant to impose a restrictive monetary
policy in the event of a threatened re—acceleration of price inflation, and
therefore impart an inflationary bias to U.S. monetary policy on average over
the ups and downs of future business cycles?
Section I highlights the extent to which U.S. borrowing behavior in the
1980's has departed from prior relationships, including both the rise in the
overall debt—income ratio and the absence of negative correlation between
public— and private—sector debt ratios, by contrasting this most recent period
with the earlier experience since the Korean War. Section II focuses on the
corresponding experience of the assets held by the economy's private sector,
broken down separately between individuals and businesses, in order to learn
whether what stands behind this increased private—sector indebtedness can
plausibly provide some assurance of borrowers' ability to service it. Section
2III examines the experience of debt delinquency and default in previous
episodes of tight monetary policy, and offers some speculations about the
implications of recent developments in individual and business balance sheets
for the conduct of monetary policy. Section IV briefly summarizes the paper's
principal findings, and concludes with a note of caution about the implications
ofthe steady rise since 1980 inthe federal government'sindebtedness.
3I. Debt Income,Before After 1g80
One of the most striking features of the U.S. financial system during the
post—World War II era ——butnot since 1980 ——hasbeen the stable relationship
between debt and economic activity. The outstanding debt of all U.S. obligors
other than financial intermediaries, expressed as a percentage of gross
national product, fluctuated (mostly cyclically) within a narrow range
throughout this period, with no evident time trend.1 The debt ratio measured
in this way has been especially stable since the Korean War, with a 1953—80
mean of 137.1% and corresponding standard deviation of 2.9%2 Moreover, except
for the depression of the 1930's, the debt ratio was also fairly stable, and
trendless, during the pre-war period extending as far back into the nineteenth
century as available data permit.3
What makes the pre—1980's steadiness of the U.S. economy's overall debt—
income relationship especially striking is that it did not represent merely the
sumofindividually stable elements. At least throughout thiscenturythere
have been wide swings,relativeto gross national product, in the indebtedness
of individuals, businesses, and government considered separately. As Figure 1
shows for the post—Korean Warperiod,however, until 1980 these sector—specific
debtlevels exhibited sufficient negative covariation ——especiallybetween
private—sector debt and federal government debt ——torender the economy—wide
overall debt ratio essentially trend1ess) The federal government component of
the debt ratio exhibited strong negative correlation with the private—sector
components, either individually or taken together, not just during 1953—80
(when the significant negative correlation could have reflected opposing time
trends), but also over much longer periods dating back asfar as World War I.
















































































































































































































































 pattern of a stable total consisting of negatively covarying components. At
yearend 1980 the total debt ratio stood at 137.7%, well within one standard
deviation of the 1953—80 mean. By yearend 1985 the debt ratio was 169.2%, more
thaneleven standard deviations higher, and above any prior U.S. debt level
recorded in this century except for 1931—35 (when many recorded debts had
defaulted de facto anyway). Further, as Table 1 shows, all major classes of
U.S. nonfinancial borrowers except farmers have participated in thisincreased
indebtednesssince 1980. The longstand1ng slgnifAcant negatIve correlation
between the federal government and the private—sector components of the debt
ratiohas, accordingly, turned positive.
Not surprisingly, most of the familiar measures of financial asset holding
in the United States have also shown major increases (at least in relation to
previously established time trends) during the 1980's. This parallel behavior
of asset holding behavior, at least at the aggregate level, is potentially of
major importance in the context of concerns about threats to financial
stabilityposed by rapid accumulation of debt, in that no cogent economic
theory suggests gauging risks by looking at liabilities without attentionto
assets.Both sides of the balance sheet matter.
Ifthe United States were a closed economy, any increase indebt
liabilitiesout standing would necessarily involve an equal increase in debt
assets held. The same would be true for an open economy if the current
account were always just in balance, so that foreign capital inflows or
outflows always netted to zero, and if there were no net debt-equity asset
swaps with foreigners. In fact, the U.S. current account has moved into record
deficit range in the 1980's, presumably as a consequence of the combination of
loose fiscal and tight monetary policies pursued throughout this period. Even
51BLE 1.
INCREASE .LN. IHU.S.DEBT RATIO. 1980—1985
DebtRatto
Borrower 1980 1985 Change
Households 50.9%58.5% +7.6%
Businesses 50.3 57.9 +7.6
Corporations 32.1 36.8 +11.8
Farms 5.6 11.11 —1.2
Other 12.616.6 +11.0
State—Local Governments 10.1113.3 +2.9
Federal Government 26.1 39.1! +13.11
AllNonfinancial Borrowers 137.7% 169.2% +31.5%
Notes: Figures for 1980 and 1985 are yearend totals of credit market
liabilities, expressed as percentages of' corresponding
fourth—quarter gross national product (seasonally
adjusted, at annual rates).
Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.so, the cumulative sum of the U.S. current account deficits sustained during
1981—85 was only $231 billion, and the sum of recorded foreign net financial
investment in the United States during this five—year period was just $139
billion. In addition, the net exchange of equity with foreign issuers and
investors, including both portfolio and direct investment, was close to zero
through this period. Hence the increase in the total nonfinancial debt ratio
by as much as 31.5% between yearend 1980 and yearend 1985 necessarily increased
the total of debt assets held domestically, however measured, by a huge amount.
Table2 places the rise of the total nonfinancial debt ratio in the
context of' the increase in analogous ratios to gross national product for major
U.S.asset aggregates. As of yearend 1985, the ratios for total net assets,
the monetary base and the narrow Ml money stock all stood at levels which, on a
proportional basis, deviated from their respective prior trends
by as much as or more than the total nonfinancial debt ratio.5 Because the
previous relationships for the monetary base and Ml were less stable, however,
these deviations were less dramatic when expressed as multiples of' their
respective standard deviations. By contrast, the broader money stock measures
M2 and M3 deviated far less from their historical relationships, in comparison
to either prior levels or prior volatility.
From the standpoint of potential threats to financial stability, however,
what has attracted concern has been increasing indebtedness, and in particular
the increasing indebtedness of borrowers in the economy's private sector. In
this context the parallel behavior of (some but not all) aggregate—level asset
holding relationships can be reassuring only to a limited degree. It is
crucial also that both the composition and the distribution of the assets held
enhance borrowers' ability to service their obligations. Drawing such

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 II. Assets .an.Liabilities Private Sector
Debt liabilities are obligations to payinterest,and to repay principal,
at specifiedtimesin the future. Even under circumstances in which there is
every expectation of refinancing the principal when it is due, by issuing debt
borrowers assume the obligation to meet future interest payments. Their
ability to do so depends in the first instance on the incomes they will
receive, and also on the assets they will have available to liquidate if doing
so becomes necessary.
In aggregate, the U.S. economy has become more heavily indebted during the
1980's, in relation to both income and assets. The outstanding credit market
debt obligations of all nonfinancial borrowers rose from a 1953-80 mean of 1.37
timesgross national product as of yearend 1980 to a post—depression record
1.69 times gross national product as of yearend 1985 ——anincrease in
indebtedness equal to nearly one—third of a year's income. Gross national
product is not necessarily the most precise measure of the aggregate of income
flows available to service this debt, of course, but more specifically refined
measuresof debt service capacity tend to move sufficiently in step with gross
nationalproduct over time that an increase of this magnitude in the simple
debt ratio is surely indicative.
It is alwayspossible, of course, that an economy (or an individual
borrower)may incur more debt in relation to income because net worth has also
risen in relation to income. In such circumstances incurring additional debt
liabilities,even relative to income, merely preserves previously existing
balancesheet relationships. In the United States, however, there has been no
significant change in the economy's aggregate net worth in relation to income
during this period. As of yearend 1985 the U.S. economy's consolidated net
7worth, with reproducible tangible assets measured on a current cost basis and
land measured at market value, was $12.6 trillion, or 3.09 times fourth—quarter
gross national product ——roughlyin line with the approximately 3—to-i ratio
that has prevailed for decades.6 Hence the extraordinary increase in the
nonfinancial debt ratio since 1980 has, in the aggregate, simply represented a
higher leveraging of existing economic activity, with greater debt levels in
relation to net worth as well as income.
Because the cumulative U.S. current account deficit during 1981—85 was
small in comparison to this increase in indebtedness (and because net debt—
equity asset exchanges with foreigners were even smaller), more debt
liabilities owed by U.S. borrowers mean more debt assets held by U.S.
investors. Hence the economy's aggregate 1985 balance sheet does include more
nominally denominated assets to accompany the higher levels of nominally
denominated liabilities. Whether or not the resulting higher debt ratio poses
the threat of financial instability, however, depends not just on economy—wide
asset and liability aggregates but on the distribution of those assets and
liabilities ——thatis, whether the borrowers who owe the liabilities also
hold enough assets, and the right kind of assets, to ensure their ability to
service their obligations in the event of an inadequacy in their incomes.
Households
Of the 31.5% increase in the U.S. economy's total nonfinancial debt ratio
between 1980 and 1985, 7.6% consisted of increased indebtedness of households
(mostly individuals, but also personal trusts and non—profit organizations).
Table 3 shows the aggregate U.S. household sector balance sheet, broken down
into broad categories of assets and liabilities, with holdings of tangible
reproducible assets (mostly houses and consumer durables) measured on a current
8TABLE I
BALANCE SHEET Q U.S. HOUSEHOLD SECTOR. 1960-1985
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Total Assets 3814.6% 367.6% 356.1% 330.3% 367.6% 3714.5%
Tangible 119.3 1O'I.7 113.3 119.2 136.0 125.6
Financial 265.14 263.0 2142.8 211.1 231.6 2148.8
Deposits 116.3 51.5 52.8 56.0 56.9 65.9
Debt. Mkt. Insts. 29.3 23.7 214.14 20.1 18.5 25.0
Equities 77.1 86.8 70.7 38.6 141.7 145.14
Other 112.8 100.9 914.9 96.5 1114.5 112.5
Total Liabilities 1414.5% 149.0% 148.6% 147.14% 52.9% 60.6%
Home Mortgages 26.8 29.3 28.1 28.0 33.2 35.8
Consumer Credit 12.7 14.1 13.9 13.3 13.2 16.6
Other 5.0 5.6 6.6 6.1 6.6 8.2
Worth 3110.1% 318.6% 307.5% 282.9% 3111.7% 313.9%
Notes: Data are yearend values, sealed by corresponding fourth—quarter gross
national product (seasonally adjusted, at annual rates).
Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.cost basis and both land and corporate equities measured at market value, all
scaled in relation to gross national product. Because it is helpful to place
the changes that have taken place thus far during the 1980's in the context of
at least a somewhat longer time span, the table presents comparable data by
five—year intervals over the last quarter—century.
The recent growth in household sector liabilities stands out clearly in
these data. After only modest variation in their indebtedness relative to
gross national product between 1960 and 1975, households sharply increased
their debt position in the late 1970's and again in the early i98o'. During
the late 1970's home mortgage borrowing accounted for substantially all of the
Increased household indebtedness. By contrast, during the early 1980's all
forms of household indebtedness rose, including home mortgages, and especially
consumer credit.
Because households' net worth recovered between 1975 and 1980, and then
remained roughly constant between 1980 and 1985, by 1985 households did hold
additional assets at least in pace with their increased liabilities. Indeed,
during this ten—year period in which households' liabilities increased in
relation to a year's gross national product by one—eighth, households' total
assets increased by nearly one—half of a year's gross national product.
The greater part of this increase in asset holdings took highly illiquid
forms, however. Rising real estate prices during the late 1970's resulted in
major increases In holdings of tangible assets (dominated by houses and land)
as well as in equity positions In nonincorporated farms and other businesses
(which dominate the "other" financial asset category, along with pension and
life insurance reserves). Only under conditions of severe distress are such
assets available for sale to service debt. The ten—year combined increase in
holdings of deposits, debt market instruments and corporate equities amounted
9to only one-fifth of a year's gross national product, more nearly in line with
the increase in liabilities.
Moreover, the available evidence suggests that the distribution of these
more liquid assets within the household sector hardly matches the distribution
of the additional household indebtedness. For example, Table 1summarizesthe
respective distributions of consumer credit owed and of liquid and non—liquid
financial assets held, across various income classes of U.S. households, based
onthe 1983 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances. Not surprisingly, the
debt distribution does not match the asset distribution. Families with less
than$10,000 in annual income constituted 25% of U.S. households in 1983.
Among such families, 39% owed at least some consumer debt, with mean
indebtedness per family (whether borrowing or not) of $1,178; 66% of such
families owned financial assets, with mean value per family (whether owning or
not) of $2,988. By contrast, families with $30,000 or more in annual income
constituted 30% of U.S. households in 1983. Among these families, 77% owed at
least some consumer debt, with mean indebtedness per family of $6,229; 99% of
such families owned financial assets, with mean value per family of $58,525.
Hence the ratio ofmean family financial asset holdings to mean family consumer
indebtednessvaried from 2.5—to-i for the lower income group to 9.1I—to—1 for
the upper income group.8
Further, to the extent that much of the limited 1975—85 increase in
household ownership of readily marketable financial assets took the form of
debt market instruments and corporate equities, rather than deposits, there are
yet further reasons for doubt that the household sector's higher aggregate
asset—income ratio provides fully satisfactory stability behind Its higher





Annual Fanj.].y Income Credit TotalLiauid Nonliould
Below $10,000 8.6% 3.1% 1.7% 1.2%
$10,000 —19,999 l8.1 11.8 17.3 5.
$20,000 —29,999 18.k 12.7 l7.' 7.2
$30,000 —19,999 26.6 21.3 26.1 15.7
$50,000 and over 28.0 51.1 3k.5 70.5
Source: Author's calculations, based ondatain Avery et al.
(1981a,b).as up. For example, more than all of the entire rise in household ownership of
corporate equities between 1975 and 1985 ——notjust in relation to income, but
absolutely ——reflectedincreased equity prices. Throughout the past quarter—
century, U.S. households considered directly have in fact been net sellers of
equity securities. A significant reversal of equity prices would erode
household assets, just as the recent market rally has enhanced them.
The othermajor reason for concern inthis regardisthat, as the
distributionofnon—liquid asset holdings reported in Table i suggests,
ownership of corporate equities and of negotiable debt market instruments is
even more skewed toward the upper income groups than is ownership of financial
assets in general. For theUnited States as a whole, only 19%of all families
owned directly any equities at all as of 1983, and among the one—quarter of
families with less than $10,000 in annual income only 5% did so. Further, the
top 2% of all families (ranked by income) owned 50% of allequities,while the
top 10% of all families owned 72% of all equities.9 Clearly these assets are
not generally available for liquidation, If necessary, to facilitate servicing
the liabilities of the typical U.S. household.
Finally, balance sheet relationships like those summarized in Table 3
fully describe debt burdens only if both real and nominal interest rates remain
constant over time. When real interest rates rise, the share of income
required for pure debt service, in an economic sense, rises even if
indebtedness as measured by outstanding debt-income ratios is unchanged. Even
when nominal interest rates rise solely because of more rapid expected and
realized price inflation, stated interest payments also rise in relation to
income, with the increment representing a faster required repayment of
principal. As Figure 2 shows, personal interest payments as a share of
11% of Earnings
FIGURE 2









1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985personal disposable income have risen steadily since the Korean War, from a low
of 2.5% in 1953 to a high of 7.6% in 19811 (the most recent data currently
available). In light of the sharp rise both in household indebtedness and in
market interest rates during the 1980's, it is surprising that this increase
has been so smooth. The reason presumably lies in the long maturity of home
mortgages, which account for the majority of household debt owed, together with
the inflexibility of interest rates on most consumer credit transactions.
From the perspective of financial stability, however, the point remains that
the share of household income required to avoid debt default has risen substantially.
Businesses
As Table 1 shows, households and businesses have been equally responsible
for the post—1980 increase in the U.S. economy's nonfinancial debt ratio.
Especially for corporate businesses, however, the issues involved in the
increased indebtedness of the past decade are more straightforward than In the
case of households. Unlike households, U.S. business corporations on average
have not taken on additional debt in order to hold greater amounts of liquid or
other readily marketable financial assets. Hence questions about whether the
distribution of the additional debt matches the distribution of the additional
assets do not arise in the case of the corporate sector, because there are no
additional corporate financial assets. Instead, the U.S. corporate business
sector has simply substituted debt for equity financing behind a largely
unchanged asset position.
Table 5 presents balance sheet data for the U.S. nonfinancial corporate
business sector in a form comparable to the household data shown In Table 3.
The increase in the corporate sector's credit market debt, from 32.1% of gross
national product at yearend 1980 to 36.8% as of yearend 1985, marked the first
12TABLE 5
BALANCE SHEET U.S. NONFARM CORPORATE BUSINESS SECTOR. 1960-1985
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 19B5
Total Assets 131 .6% 119.7% 126.6% 131.6% 139.8% 132.6%
Tangible 96.1 814.3 90.7 98.11 1011.9 99.1
Financial 35.14 35.14 35.9 33.2 314.9 33.11
Liquid 10.0 8.6 6.7 7.5 6.9 8.0
Other 25.14 26.7 29.1 25.8 28.0 25.14
Total Liabilities 116.6% 117.6% 52.5% 115.9% 118.5% 53.3%
Market Debt 30.1 30.3 314.11 32.7 32.1 36.8
Trade Debt 12.5 13.11 15.7 10.8 12.6 12.0
Other 14.0 14.0 2.14 2.5 3.8 115
Worth 85.0% 72.1% 714.0% 85.7% 91.14% 79.2%
Notes: Data are yearend values, scaled by corresponding fourth—quarter gross
national product (seasonally adjusted, at annual rates).
Detail maynotadd to totals due to rounding.
Data for trade debt reflect a break in 19711.
Source:Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.major departure from the pattern of approximately steady indebtedness in
relationto income that had prevailed for the prior two decades. 10
In sharp contrast to the household sector's accumulation of both financial
and tangible assetsin pace with its accumulation of debt during the late
1970'sand early 1980's, as of yearend 1985 the corporate sector's financial
andtangible assets both stood at almost exactly the same point inrelation to
grossnational product as in 1975. Moreover, even within the overall financial
asset category, corporate businesses' mix of liquid and non—liquid assets
showed essentially no change. Hence there are no additional assets behind the
new accumulation of corporate debt, which has resulted simply from debt—for—
equity exchanges on the other side of the corporate sector's balance sheet.
These exchanges have largely emerged in the course of a wave of corporate
re—organizationsthat constitutes a major phenomenon worthy of study in its own
right. American businesscorporations have traditionally issued onlyminima].
amountsof new equity securities, mostly relying on internally generated funds
to maintain desired debt—equity ratios. During 1960—83, for example, the
average net new funding in the equity market (that is, gross new issues less
retirements) by nonfinancial business corporations was only $11 billion per
year.By contrast, the series of mergers, acquisitions, leveraged buy—outs and
other reorganizations that took place during 19811 and 1985 alone resulted in a
two—year net retirement of $156 billion of equities ——anamount equal to
approximately 11% of a year's gross national product —-asfirms used borrowed
funds to buy their own and other firms' equities.11
Hence almost all of the increase in the corporate sector's indebtedness
shown in Table 1 is attributable to the corporate re—organization wave of just
the past two years. Whether or not this increase in corporate indebtedness
(relative to both income and assets) will ultimately threaten the financial
13stability of U.S. business remains to be seen, of course. Rising equity prices
approximately neutralized the balance sheet impact of the aggregate debt—for—
equity exchange during this period, so that the corporate sector's aggregate
debt—equity ratio (with equity measured at market value) rose from 69%at
yearend 1983 to only 76% as of yearend 1985 ——roughlyin line with the average
75% that prevailed through the 1970's, though well above the corresponding 19%
inthe 1950's and l3% in the 1960's. As data presented in Section III below
make clear, however, the experience of business debt default during the first
half of the 1980's was distinctly more severe than anything that had occurred
earlier on since the 1930's.
Whether the level of corporate debt prevailing today raises the prospect
of future instability will ultimately depend not on current balance sheet
relationships but on whether the cash flows realized by business corporations
are or are not sufficiently in line with the expectations underlying the recent
borrowing and lending activity. The strong performance of equity prices during
1981_85, despite continuing high real interest rates, suggests that equity
market investors also share corporate borrowers' and lenders' favorable
expectations of future business cash flows, at least to some degree. Still, as
Figure2shows, the share of corporate earnings (before interest and taxes)
requiredtomeet corporate interest payments has jumped during the 1980's far
beyond even the historically high level of the 1970's, as a result of greater
indebtedness at a time of unusually high interest rates.
Among non—corporate businesses, the relationship between changing debt
levels and potential financial instability is less straightforward. As Table 1
shows, between 1980 and 1985 the U.S. farm sector actually reduced its
indebtedness relative to gross national product. This modestly lower debt
14level hardly implies a sounder financial basis for U.S. farms, however.
Because of declining market prices for agricultural land, the farm sector's
aggregate net worth in relation to grossnationalproduct more than halved
during the early 1980's ——from30.6% of gross national product at yearend 1980
to 11L9% as of yearend 1985. The current crisis in U.S. agriculture is a
strikingdemonstration of the importanceof cash flowsand of balance sheet
positions in full, rather than Just debt levels, in determining borrowers'
financial health or problems.
By contrast, borrowing by non—corporate businesses other than farms raised
thetotal US. nonfinancial debt ratio by almost as much as corporate borrowing
during 1980—85, despite a far smaller initial non—corporate debt level. This
rise in non—farm non—corporate business indebtedness, however, was not all that
out of line with a general increase in the debt levels of such borrowers that
began many years earlier. Moreover, almost all of these businesses' increased
debt has been in the form of mortgage financing, and it has taken place against
even more substantially enlarged holdings of tangible assets (including mostly
land and residential real estate, but also some business plant and equipment).
Asaresult, the aggregate net worth of the non—farm non-corporate business
sector, which had risen from 31.3% of gross national product in 1975 to 15.2%
in 1980, increased further to 1t7.2% in 1985 despite the higher 1985 debt level.
Much of this activity has reflected efforts, carried out either individually or
via partnerships, to exploit various "shelter" provisions of the tax code.
Thechiefthreat to the financial soundness of non—corporate business
borrowers is therefore the possibility of a reversal in the real estate market,
such that future rental incomesrealizedare not consistent with current
values, and cash flows become insufficient to service outstanding debts. One
potentially significant factor in this context, shown in Figure 2, is that non-
15corporate business borrowers' interest payments have jumped sharply since 1980
as a share of proprietors' pre-tax income. Another is that non-farm non-
corporatebusiness holdings of liquid assets have declined steadily during most
of the post World War II period. In 1955 these borrowers' liquid assets
modestly exceeded their mortgage debt outstanding (2.7% of gross national
product versus 2.5%), and their financial assets in total exceeded their total
outstanding debt (5.3% of gross national product versus 1L9%).By1985, while
their total indebtedness had risen to 16.8% of gross national product (13.9% in
mortgage form), their holdings of all financial assets had fallen to 2.5% of
gross national product, and of'liquidassets to only .3%.Hencethese
borrowers' available financial cushion, which could enable timely debt service
to continue in the context of reduced or interrupted cash flows, has steadily
shrunk.
State anLocalGovernments
Finally, as Table 1 shows, the remaining 2.9% of the 1980—85 increase in
the U.S. nonfinancial debt ratio not due to the federal government reflects
increased indebtedness of state and local governments. As is clear from Figure
1, this development has represented a sharp reversal of a general pattern of
declining relative indebtedness of state and local governments that had
prevailed ever since the late 1960's. With changing demographic trends
eliminating pressures to expand the capacity of public school facilities, and
more and more localities having completed the major hospital, sewer system and
road projects that were characteristic of the earlier post—war years, the
outstandingstate-local government debt declined from nearly 15%of gross
national product in 1970 to less than 11% in the early 1980's.
16It is readily apparent that morethanall of the subsequent increase has
reflected a form of financial intermediation by state and local governments.
Frequently during the 1980's, state and local governments have issued
securities,either to refund in advance their outstanding but as yet non—
callable long—term debt or to fund a variety of other programs, and have had
funds to invest for the interim. There investments have typically gone into
U.S.Government securities.12 For decadesstate—local government holdings of
U.S.Government securities fluctuated narrowly within a range of 2—3% of gross
nationalproduct, and as recently as yearend1982 their holdings of these
securities were still within the historical range. By yearend 1985, however,
these holdings had risen to 7.1% of gross national product, with much of the
increase occuring just within the last few months of 1985 (presumably in
anticipationof a change in the relevant tax code provisions governing the
ability to issue tax—exempt debt). Had state and local governments during
1980—85merely maintained their holdings of U.S. Governmentsecurities
unchangedat the yearend 1980 level of 2.6% of gross national product, and done
nothing else differently, their outstanding indebtednessrelative to gross
nationalproduct would therefore have declined by 1.6% insteadofrising by
2.9% as shown in Table 1.
Because these borrowers have matching portfolios of U.S. Government
securities behind theirincreased indebtedness, there is presumably no reason
whythe state-local government contribution to thehigher overall U.S. debt
ratiocarries any negative implications for financial stability.
Overview
In sum, the different categories of private—sector borrowers who
collectively issued enough liabilities to add 18.1% to the U.S. nonfinancial
17debt ratio between 1980 and 1985 did so under widely disparate circumstances,
with correspondingly differing implications for the U.S. economy's financial
stability. Households in aggregate took on more debt but also more assets,
including liquid and other readily marketable financial assets. Business
corporations in aggregate merely substituted debt for equity, without taking on
additional assets of any kind. Non—corporate businesses issued more debt to
match their higher values of real estate assets, but further reduced their
alreadythin holdings of liquid assets. State and local governments simply
engaged in arbItrage between the taxable and taxexempt bond markets.
Clearly,whatever threat to financial stability may exist as a result of
this mixed experience lies primarily with the prospect that household and
business cash flows may fall short of the expectations on which both borrowers
and lenders proceeded during this period. Such a shortfall, for the economy in
general, rather thanjust in isolated regions orsectors, is most likely in the
contextof a business recession.
18III. Debt Defaults, Recessions. MonetaryPolicy
Much of the potential importance of financial Instability, as a matter of
public policy concern, stems from the fundamental two—way interrelationship
between the financial phenomenon of debtors' distress and contractions in
nonfinancial economic activity. On one side, the chief economic danger posed
by an overextended debt structure is that the failure of some borrowers to meet
their obligations will lead to cash flow inadequacies for their creditors (who
may, in turn, also be borrowers, and so on), and that both borrowers and
creditors facing insufficient cash flows will then be forced to curtail their
demands in the economy's product and factor markets. Similarly, forced
disposal of assets by debtors and others facing insufficient cash flows will
lead to declines in asset prices, hence eroding the ability of other asset
owners to realize the expected value of their assets if sale becomes necessary,
and threatening the solvency (in a balance sheet sense) of still others. This
causal process, running from financial constraint to nonfinancial contraction,
has long been familiar in the analysis of business downturns.13 Indeed, it is
implicit in essentially all models of quantity—constrained effective aggregate
demand,even those that exclude an explicit representation of the credit
market. 1
Atthe same time, the likelihood that an aggregate—level problem of
debtors' distress will arise in the first place is clearly not independent of
what is happening in the nonfinancial economy. Apart from occasional instances
of recklessness, incompetence or fraud, most borrowers typically expect to be
ableto service their debts in a timely fashion. In other words, they expect
that their available cash flows ——and,ifnecessary,the value of their
salableassets ——willbe sufficient to meet the requisite sequence of payments
19due. For most borrowers, however, includingindividuals aswell asbusinesses,
boththe size of cash flows and the value of marketable assets depend to a
great extent on prosperity or recession in the economy at large. In
particular, business downturns typically shrink the cash flows of many
borrowers,slow cash flow growth formost others, and in many cases also reduce
themarket values of equities, houses and other assets.
Hence problems of financial instability are most likely to erupt in the
context of just the kind of nonfinancial economic difficulty that they tend to
aggravate. Limitations on individuals' and businesses' activities arising from
widespread financial distress restrict economy—wide demands for goods and
services, and for labor and capital inputs, and hence depress overall economic
activity. At the same time, a contraction of economic activity is the most
likely initial cause of widespread debtors' distress in the first place.
Table 6 presents data illustrating this cyclical feature of the emergence
of financial distress amongbothindividual and business borrowers in the
UnitedStates. The percentage of consumer debt in delinquency is typically
greater at or near the trough of business recessions than at other times.
Similarly,both the business failure rate and the total amount of defaulted
liabilities In business failures (scaled in relation to gross national product)
bulge during and just after business cycle troughs. Especially for business
debt problems, the data showninTable 6 also make clear the extraordinary
character of the economy' s experience in this regard during the first half of
the1980's. In 1981—83 both the business failure rate and the failed business
liability rate rose to levels far beyond those seen in any prior recession
sinceWorld War II, andboth indicatorsofbusiness financial distress
continuedto rise in 1981_1985 despite the economy's renewed expansion.15
Whatever threat to financial stability the post-1980 rise in the U.S.
20TABLE
DEBTDEFAULT iiiPOST-WARBUSINESS RECESSIONS
Delinquent Consumer Numbers of Liabilities in
Installment Loans Business Failures Business Failures 11.outstandings) (per 10,000 concerns) 11Q.LGNP)
Meanfor 1953—80 1.91% 1111 .16%
Recessionsduring 1953—80
19511 1.89% 112 .12%
1958 1.67 56 .16
1961 1.78 611 .20
1970 1.811 1111 .19
1975 2.61 113 .27
1980 2.61 112 .17
Experience since 1980
1981 2.38% 61 .23%
1982 2.211 88 .119
1983 2.01 110 .117
19811 1.96 116 .116
1985 2.31 123 .511
Notes:Delinquent consumer loans are loans in arrears more than thiry days.
Business failures comprise concerns involved in court proceedings or voluntary
actions involving loss to creditors.
Liabilities in business failures exclude long—term, publicly—held securities.
Sources: American Bankers Association, Dun & Bradstreet, U.S. Department of
Commerce.economy's debt ratio presents, for any period into the future, is therefore
fundamentally dependent on the nonfinancial performance of the economy during
that period. For example, if the economy were henceforth to achieve a decade
of sustained rapid growth, with only minimal interruptions, then it is
plausible that whatever debt service problems emerged would be localized within
specific industries (like energy and agriculture in the mid—1980's), or
specific geographical regions especially dependent on those industries. In
that case there would be little reason to expect the kind of widespread
borrowers' distress that would be likely to exert substantial contractionary
pressures on nonfinancial economic activity. With sustained rapid growth of
incomes and profits, most borrowers would realize cash flows (and market values
of assets) adequate to meet their obligations. Indeed, a sufficient period of
sustained rapid economic growth could readily shrink the economy's overall debt
ratio back to its historical range, not by reducing the numerator but by
enlarging the denominator.
By contrast, given the strongly cyclical pattern of debtors' distress in
the past, the historically high levels of individual and business indebtedness
outstanding as of the midpoint of the 1980's suggest that the onset of a major
new business recession under these circumstances could easily lead to debt
service problems of a kind that would, in turn, further magnify the initial
contractionarymovement in nonfinancial economic activity. As of yearend 1985
both individuals and businesses were more highly leveraged, in relation to
income levels, than at any time since World War II. Moreover, as the data
shown in Table 5 make clear, the corporate business sector in particular had no
greater asset position, in either liquid or any other form, to support its
greater debt-to—income position. In the event of a recession causing reduced
21incomes and depressed asset values generally ——thatis, a recession typical of
those that the United States has experienced during the post—war period ——the
possibilityof financial instability that would compound an already
deteriorating economic situation isentirelyplausible.
Twoprincipal implicationsfollowfrom this conclusion. First, in the
event of a business contraction initiated by some entirely external factor ——
forexample, an international cartel action comparable to the oil price
increases imposed by OPEC in 1973 and again in 1979 —-theU.S. economy would
exhibit less resilience, and correspondingly more proclivity to contractionary
dynamics, because of the greater potential for financial instability. Second,
to the extent that U.S. policymakers are aware of this potential instability,
and that they can and do exert influence over the path of aggregate economic
activity, the onset of a major business recession is itself less likely. Given
the Important role of monetary policy in bringing about (or at least not
resisting) each of the most significant post—war U.S. recessions, this
implication for the likely future behavior of monetary policymakers is probably
the more important of the two.
Hence the main point is that, because of the increased likelihood of
debtors' distress in the event of an economic downturn, the Federal Reserve
System is likely to be less willing either to seek or to permit a business
recession in the United States. At the relevant margin of policy choice, U.S.
monetary policymakers are likely to perceive the real costs of a business
recession ——interms of foregone output, incomes, jobs, capital formation, and
so on ——asgreater than would be the case without the higher levels of
individual and business indebtedness. On average over an extended period,
therefore, U.S. monetary policy is likely to be more expansionary than it would
bein the absence of a higher debt ratio.
22In light of the key role historically played by periodic episodes of tight
monetary policy in either arresting or reducing price inflation, both in the
United States and elsewhere, this likelihood of a bias toward more expansionary
monetary policy on average, due to a greater reluctance to tolerate business
contractions, raises the prospect of inflation as the ultimate chief
consequenceof the higher U.S. debt ratio. In the United States, for example,
the historical record makes clear that the restrictive monetary policy that
figured so importantlyin the major recessions of1957—58, 1973—75and 1981—82
(thethree largest recessions of the post-war perIod) In each case arose
largely out of Federal Reserve policymakers' desire to slow the then prevailing
rate of price inflation. In each case the recession did accomplish just that
end. Although it is theoretically possible to achieve both price stability and
steadyeconomic growth, without the occasional punctuation of business
contractions, nothing in the post-war U.S. experience suggests that doing so is
practically feasible. Instead, this experience suggests that if a higher debt
ratio raises the cost of business contractions, and hence makes policyinakers
less likely to accept them, it therefore also imparts an inflationary bias.16
In time, of course, a sufficient amountof price inflation can also
restore the debt ratio to its historical range, just as could sustained real
growth. Thesetwooutcomes are analytically parallel, and hardly incompat-
ible. Sincealmost all debts outstanding in the United States are nominally
denominated, what matters for borrowers' ability to meet their obligations is
nominal cashflows, andnominal values of marketableassets. These nominal
values may rise because of increases in either their real or their price
component,or both. Either, in sufficient magnitude, would preclude the kind
of widespread debt service problems that can threaten financial stability.
23Which is more likely is a question of achievable economic performance,
presumably to be judged on the basis of both past experience and future
economic policies.
21IV. ConcludingComments
The U.S. economy's nonfinancial debt ratio has risen since 1980 to a level
that is extraordinary in comparison with prior historical experience.
Approximately one—half of this rise has consisted of increased indebtedness
(relative to income) of borrowers in the economy's private sector, including
both individuals and businesses, and it therefore at least potentially
represents an increase in the economy—wide exposure to debt default. The U.S.
household sector as a whole has increased its holdings of liquid and other
readily marketable assets, so that In the aggregate Its balance sheet Is no
less sound than before, but available data make it doubtful that the
distribution of the additional assets matches the distribution of the
additionaldebt closely enough to avoid debt service problems Inthe event of a
generaleconomiccontraction. By contrast, inthe case of businesses,
Including especially the corporate sector, there are no additional assets to
match the additional liabilities, so that balance sheets as well as Incomes
have become more leveraged.
The chief implication of this increased exposure to the threat of
financial instability is not only that the U.S. economy is likely to be more
prone to financial instability in the event of a major business contraction,
but also ——andperhaps more importantly ——that,as a result, U.S. economic
policymakers are likely to be more reluctant either to seek or to tolerate a
business recession in the first place. Experience suggests that it will be
difficult to balance the desire to avoid economic downturns with the ability to
avoidoccasional periods of aggregate excess demand, sothat this increased
reluctance to tolerate recessions probably implies a more expansionary monetary
policyon average than would otherwise be the case. ExperIence also suggests
25that a plausible result of such a no—recession monetary policy, sustained over
time, is price inflation. This process is self—limiting, however, In that over
time inflation reduces the real value of the private sector's outstanding
nominal indebtedness, hence reducing the risk of financial Instability, and
thereby removing the source of policymakers' increased reluctance to tolerate
recessions.
Finally, what about the nearly one-half of the post—1980 rise in the U.S.
economy's nonfinancial debt ratio that has consisted of increased indebtedness
of the federal government? The steady, unbroken growth of the U.S.
Government's outstanding debt from 26.1% of gross national product as of
yearend 1980 to 39.1%atyearend 1985, despite a major business expansion
during 1983—85, is clearly the element of the overall debt ratio rise that is
most out of character with prior U.S. historical experience, not just since
World War II but throughout the nation's existence. Until the 1980's,
significantsustained increases in federal government debt relative to gross
national product took place only during wartime. The contrary pattern during
this decade stands as the hallmark of post—1980 fiscal policy.
Whatare the implications of this extraordinary surge of government
indebtedness for the economy's financial stability? Despite fears now
expressed more frequently than in earlier years, in fact there remains little
prospect of a government debt default. To be sure, any fiscal policy involving
so large a government deficit as to cause the outstanding government debt to
rise faster than the economy grows, even under conditions of full employment,
is not sustainable indefinitely.17 Nevertheless, with the federal debt ratio
still fairly low in comparison with 117.9% at the end of World War II, or even
6.1% in 1960, there is as yet no reason to anticipate instability involving
government debt default.
26Instead, the chief threat to financial stability implied by the sharp
post—1980rise in the government debt ratio comes from the need to raise taxes
——andhence to reduce the incomes that individuals and businesses have
availableto meet their own debt service obligations ——inorder to service the
government's debt. Net interest payments by the federal government, which
averaged 1.1% of gross national product during the 1970's, rose to 3.2% in
1985. Moreover, there is little reason to believe that the distribution of
theseinterest payments among individual and business recipients in any way
matches either the reductIon of Incomes by tax collectIons or the dIstributIon
of private-sector debt service payments owed. Continuing Increases in
government interest payments relative to aggregate income are not likely to
lead to a government debt default, but unless they are balanced by reductions
in non—interest government spending they will on balance further reduce the
abilityof' private—sectorborrowers tomeet their own obligations.
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1. The debt total excluding financial intermediaries roughly corresponds to
Gurley andShaw's (1960)concept of "primary debt." By contrastMinsky's
analysisof financial instability (e.g., Minsky 1977) has emphasized "gross
debt," including financial intermediation. Credit market indebtedness (that
is, market liabilities other than deposits and deposit equivalents) of U.S.
financial intermediaries, relative to GNP, rose slowly but steadily throughout
thisperiod.
2. These values, like all thosereported below, are based on annual yearend par—
value debt figures scaled by the corresponding fourth-quarter GNP (seasonally
adjusted, at annual rates). They differ modestly from those reported in
Friedman (1979, 1982, 1983, etc.) because of the Commerce Department's 1985
benchmark revision of the GNP data; on average, the revision raised GNP values
during 1953—80 by 2.3%. Adjusting to a market—value basis would alter the
year—to—year pattern somewhat, but would not affect such long—run properties as
the absence of time trend. See, for example, the market-value correction
factors calculated by Strong (1986).
3. See Friedman (1980, 1982) and Goldsmith (1985).
1LOrdinary least squares regression of the total nonfinancial debt ratio on a
constantand a linear time trend, using annual data for 1953—80, results in a
coefficient on the trend variable of .08 with t—statistic 1.3.
5. Total net assets, the measure often emphasized by Kaufman (e.g., Kaufman 1979),
is the sumofdeposits and credit market instruments held by allnonfinancial
sectors, including foreign holders.
6. The standard reference is Goldsmith and Lipsey (1963). The wealth—to—income
ratio calculated in this way was 3.09 in 1960, 2.72 in 1965, 2.82 in 1970, 3.03
in 1975 and 3.111 in 1980.
7. The total household sector liability figures shown in Table 3 differ slightly
from those shown in Table 1 because of the inclusion of liabilities other than
credit market instruments (including security credit, trade credit, and
deferred or unpaid life insurance premiums).
8. These figures are computed from data presented in Avery et al. (1984a,b).
9. See again Avery et al. (19811a).10. The sharp decline shown in trade debt between 1970 and 1975 reflects a 19711
change in data gathering procedures. These liabilities are mostly held within
the corporate sector; as of yearend 1985 nonfinancial business corporations'
holdings of trade credit amounted to 15.1% of GNP. "Other" corporate sector
liabilities include mostly the foreign direct investment position of foreign—
owned U.S. firms; the increase during 1980—85 reflects the swollen net foreign
capital inflow.
11. Gross new issues totaled $113billionand gross retirements $199 billion during
these two years.
12. The U.S. Treasury issues special non—marketable debt instruments especially for
this purpose, with interest rates set so as to minimize arbitrage between the
taxableand tax-exempt market rates.
13. The basic idea has long been emphasized by Minsky; see, for example, Minsky
(19611, 1972, 1977). The classic applicationsto a specific historical event
areFisher's (1933) andHart's (1938)analyses of the depression of the 1930's;
Bernanke's(1983)analysis is more recent but in the same vein. For roughly
analogousapplications of the sameidea to describe postwar recessions,see
Wojnilower (1980)and Eoksteinand Sinai (forthcoming).
111. For example, Clower's (1965) model of income—constrained households reducing
their effectivedemand for consumer goods would makelittle sense if households
were able to borrow without restriction to make up for income shortfalls. The
same is true for Patinkin's (19119) model of sales—constrained firms reducing
their effective demand for labor.
15. The experience of the early 1980's did not match that of the early 1930's,
however. In 1932 there were 1511 business failures per 10,000 listed concerns,
and total liabilities in business failures equaled 1.59% of gross national
product. The business failure data for 19811 and 1985, including both the
failure rate and the failed liabilities rate, are adjusted to reflect breaks in
the relevant series after 1983.
16. This conclusion is also consistent with the implication of formal models of
monetarypolicy based on reputational equilibrium, like that of Barro and
Gordon (1983).
17. SeeTobin (1986)foran analysis of this kind of long—run instabilityin the
contextof U.S. fiscal policy since 1980.References
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